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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v, 
DALE RYAN MCGRATH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 950230-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in its determination 
that the statements of codefendant David Ricks were sufficiently 
attenuated from the illegal stop and seizure of McGrath and Ricks 
to be admissible at trial? 
Standard of review. Factual findings underlying a motion 
to suppress are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. The 
trial court's conclusions of law based thereon are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854-5 (Utah 1992) . 
Preserved below by pretrial motion to suppress, R. 33-7, 
and conditional guilty plea, R. 70-77 (plea affidavit) , 181-9 (plea 
colloquy). 
2. Whether Mr. Ricks' testimony is admissible under the 
inevitable discovery doctrine of Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 
448, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2511, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, 390 (1984)? 
Standard of Review. See standard above. 
Preserved below by pretrial motion to suppress, R. 33-7, 
and conditional guilty plea, R. 70-77 (plea affidavit), 181-9 (plea 
colloquy). 
3• Whether this Court should adopt a more stringent 
test for attenuation under the Utah Constitution in the live 
witness context? 
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Standard of review. This is a question of law reviewed 
for correctness. State v. Mohi, 267 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 8 (Utah 
1995). 
Preserved below at R. 163. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. McGrath was charged by information dated April 20, 
1993 with two counts of aggravated robbery (with firearm 
enhancements) in case No. 931900519. Mr. McGrath filed a motion to 
suppress which was heard (transcript, R. 190-269) and granted (R. 
245-7, 257-8). The trial court originally ruled that statements of 
co-defendant David Anthony Ricks (case 931900518) must likewise be 
suppressed. R. 258, 265. The State dismissed the charges without 
prejudice. 
The State refiled by information dated September 24, 
1993. R. 6-8. The case was transferred to Judge Moffat. R. 30. 
Mr. McGrath filed a motion to suppress (R. 33-7) which was heard on 
March 15, 1994 (transcript, R. 103-180) and denied. R. 175-6 (oral 
ruling), 56-62 (findings and conclusions, attached as Addendum A) . 
The Supreme Court denied interlocutory review. R. 64. 
Mr. McGrath entered a conditional guilty plea to two 
counts of robbery reserving his right to appeal the denial of his 
motion to suppress. R. 70-77 (plea affidavit), 181-9 (plea 
colloquy). Mr. McGrath was sentenced to concurrent statutory 
terms, stayed pending satisfactory completion of probation. R. 82-
3. This appeal ensued. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 1:00 A.M. on March 22, 1993, a masked, 
armed man robbed the clerk of a Maverick Country Store located at 
5390 S. 5600 W. , netting $130. At approximately 3:15 A.M., a 
masked, armed man robbed the clerk of a 7-Eleven store at 6398 
South Highland Drive. R. 7, 196-99. Sergeant Jack Dwyer, at the 
time the east patrol supervisor for the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
office (R. 195), proceeded to the 7-Eleven location and interviewed 
the clerk. R. 199. The clerk indicated that he saw an older model 
full size white pickup speed northbound on Highland within a minute 
or so after the robbery. R. 7, 200-1. There was no information 
concerning plate number, year, or make of the vehicle. R. 209. 
There was no other connection between the white pickup and the 
robbery other than temporal proximity in that location. R. 220. 
At 4:49 A.M., Officer Dwyer observed an older model white 
pickup just west of 39th South and Highland. R. 202. Officer Dwyer 
thought there was the possibility of a speed violation, but "didn't 
clock him long enough." R. 206. Officer Dwyer estimated the 
vehicle's speed at between 40 and 50 MPH in a 40 MPH zone, but did 
not feel comfortable writing a ticket. R. 223. Officer Dwyer 
initiated a traffic stop. R. 204. At the same time he initiated 
the traffic stop, the officer noticed that the tail pipe was 
dragging. R. 227, 245. 
Co-defendant David Ricks confessed after his arrest, and 
on April 22nd, 1993, pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. Mr. 
Ricks pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary in exchange 
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for dismissal of the remaining aggravated burglary count and four 
second degree felony counts in case No. 931900240 stemming from a 
residential burglary and theft of property valued in excess of 
$6,000, including two firearms. Mr. Ricks further agreed to 
testify against Mr. McGrath in this case. See R. 109, 141-2, 150, 
248-9, 254-7; pleadings from Mr. Ricks' criminal cases (attached as 
addendum B). In exchange for Mr. Ricks' cooperation, he received 
a probationary sentence after a 90 day diagnostic evaluation. R. 
151-4. 
The trial court granted Mr. McGrath's initial motion to 
suppress on June 9th, 1993, finding that Officer Dwyer did not have 
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Mr. McGrath's vehicle. R. 
245-7, 257-8. 
After the case was refiled, Mr. McGrath filed a new 
motion to suppress the fruits of the bad stop, asserting that the 
evidence the State sought to use was tainted by the bad stop. R. 
33-7. At the hearing the State called Marjorie McGrath, 
appellant's mother, who testified that Detective Glover left a card 
in her door, and she returned his call. R. 118. Mrs. McGrath 
recalled the night of the illegal stop and Dale's arrest, and 
recalled that Dale had been with Mr. Ricks earlier that evening. 
R. 119-20. Prior to that evening, Mrs. McGrath had only met Mr. 
Ricks once before. R. 115. She had not seen him since. R. 121, 
125. With reference to the robberies, she testified: 
Q Did your son ever indicate to you how it 
came to be that Mr. Ricks was in jail? 
A Well, yeah, he was part of the robbery. 
I knew that. 
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Q Okay. Did your son ever indicate to you 
that he was part of the robbery? 
A Yes. He told me that he was in the truck, 
he was driving the truck. 
Q Did he ever indicate to you whether or not 
a weapon was used? 
A He said that they'd been accused of it, 
but I had never seen a weapon. 
Q Okay. 
A My son, as far as -- to my knowledge, 
never owned a gun. 
Q Did he indicate to you whether any money 
was received by anybody who participated in this robbery? 
A He said that Rick[s] had given him -- Dave 
had given him $10 for gas. 
R. 121-2. On cross: 
Q And when he said he was driving the truck, 
did he indicate whether or not he knew that David was 
robbing the stores, while he was driving the truck? 
A What he told me was, he was taking Dave 
around trying to find him a place to stay for the night, 
because when he had him at my house, he -- David asked 
Dale to see if he could spend the night at my home, and 
I told him no. And so this is what I was told, that he 
was taking him someplace to find a place to stay for the 
night. 
Q So, Dale didn't indicate that he knew that 
Dave was robbing the stores while he was driving? 
A No. He didn't say anything to me. 
R. 125-6.x 
Detective James L. Glover testified that on September 9, 
1993 Officer Dwyer informed him of the white pickup and its license 
plate number. Detective Glover ran a computer check on the 
registration and learned it was registered to Mr. McGrath. R. 128-
13 0. On that day he left a card at the McGrath residence. Mrs. 
McGrath returned his call on the 10th, and informed Detective Glover 
xMrs. McGrath's testimony is only a minor focus of Mr. 
McGrath's suppression motion. Her testimony is at worst only 
mildly incriminating -- there is no indication that Dale McGrath 
was aware the robberies were occurring and was a willing 
participant in them. 
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that Dale no longer lived there and no longer owned the vehicle. 
She related that the night before Dale's arrest, he and David Ricks 
left her home together in the white pickup. He asked Mrs. McGrath 
to have Dale call him. R. 13 0. 
Dale called later that day and spoke with Detective 
Glover. R. 130. Detective Glover testified: 
Q And what did you ask him and what did he 
say? 
A Well, I told him to contact his attorney--
because he didn't want to be booked again--and make 
arrangements so that he wouldn't have to be booked, 
because we were going to file again. And I asked him to 
meet with me, but he said that he was too ill to--to meet 
with me, and so he didn't meet with me, we talked a 
little bit about the robberies, and he says-- he told me 
that the only money that he got from the whole situation 
was $10 or--which he was given, at Denny's, between the 
two robberies. 
Q Okay. Was there any more of the 
conversation that you can recall? 
A No. 
R. 132. On cross: 
Q That one of the things he said to you was 
that the only money he got was $10 that he received from 
Mr. Ricks between the two robberies? 
A That's correct. 
Q Is that right? Did he expand upon that, 
or explain that statement in any way? 
A No. He didn't want--he appeared not to 
want to talk to me and--and that was it and didn't--
Q And he didn't indicate to you whether or 
not at the time he received the money, he knew that it 
was the proceeds of a robbery, did he? 
A No. That's all he told me; he said--he 
said there was $10 between the two robberies. That's 
all. 
R. 136.2 
2These statements to Detective Glover likewise do not indicate 
that Mr. McGrath was aware that Mr. Ricks was committing armed 
robberies. Rather, they indicate a lay persons view that the $10 
Mr. Ricks gave to Mr. McGrath could not be kept by Mr. McGrath if 
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Mr. McGrath7s motion to suppress was mainly focused on 
the testimony of David Ricks, the armed robber and codefendant. He 
testified that he and Mr. McGrath discussed the robberies before 
Mr. Ricks committed them. He testified the gun Mr. Ricks used in 
the robberies belonged to Mr. McGrath. R. 143. Mr. Ricks further 
testified that Mr. McGrath signaled to him in court to give him a 
call. In that later conversation, Mr. McGrath asked Mr. Ricks to 
"take the rap for him." R. 147-8. 
The trial court entered detailed findings and 
conclusions, and refused to suppress the testimony of Mr. Ricks, 
Mrs. McGrath, or Mr. McGrath's statements to Detective Glover. R. 
56-62. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under the attenuation standards set forth in Ceccolini, 
the testimony of codefendant David Ricks should have been 
suppressed. The police only learned of Mr. Ricks' existence as a 
result of an illegal traffic stop. His cooperation and testimony 
is the result of direct exploitation of that bad stop. Had he not 
been stopped and found in possession of the robbery proceeds, he 
would never have come forward. Police contact with Mr. Ricks after 
the stop was immediate, and the passage of time has not purged the 
taint. Finally, the purpose of the illegal traffic stop was to 
obtain evidence of the robberies at issue. The testimony must be 
suppressed. 
it were the proceeds of a robbery. 
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Mr. Ricks' testimony would not have been inevitably 
discovered. Mr. Ricks only cooperated and agreed to testify 
because of the illegal traffic stop resulting in his being caught 
with the robbery proceeds. Absent that nexus, there was nothing 
tying him to the robberies and for reasons of pure self interest he 
would not reveal his knowledge. Mr. Ricks had no independent 
motivation. The inevitable discovery doctrine does not establish 
an independent basis for admitting his testimony. 
Under article I, section 14, this Court should reject 
Ceccolini and apply the same attenuation analysis to live witness 
testimony as is applied to physical evidence. Ceccolini muddies 
the distinctions between the independent source doctrine, 
inevitable discovery doctrine, and attenuation doctrine. This 
Court should also clarify that temporal proximity is only relevant 
to the extent that something occurs during that time to dissipate 
the taint of the prior illegality. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TESTIMONY OF DAVID RICKS AND THE 
OTHER WITNESSES SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED AS 
UNATTENUATED FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE. 
The exclusionary rule applies to exclude the evidentiary 
fruits of fourth amendment violations committed by the police. 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 
(1914). The Supreme Court made clear in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920) that 
no derivative use was to be made of illegally seized evidence. 
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"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence 
in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not 
be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all." 
Id. at 392. 
Despite the initial illegality, evidence may be 
admissible if it is sufficiently attenuated from the illegal 
conduct to purge the taint, see Nardone v. United States, 3 08 U.S. 
338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 268, 84 L.Ed. 307, 312 (1939); Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 
The evidence here lacks sufficient attenuation to purge the taint 
of the illegal stop. 
A. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS. 
In Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 
L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), the Supreme Court set forth the factors to be 
considered in analyzing whether evidence is obtained by 
exploitation of prior police illegality, including: temporal 
proximity, presence or absence of intervening circumstances, and 
especially the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. 
Id. at 603-4. See also State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300-01 (Utah 
1992); State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 690-1 n.4 (Utah 1990) 
(recognizing Brown factors in search consent context), State v. 
Thurman, 846 P. 2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993) (directing courts to apply 
Brown factors in search consent context). 
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 
55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978) is the leading Supreme Court case on whether 
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live witness testimony is sufficiently attenuated from an illegal 
search or seizure to be admissible. In Ceccolini, a uniformed 
police officer named Biro, while on a break, went to visit an 
acquaintance named Lois Hennessey at the flower shop at which she 
worked. While there, he noticed an envelope with money sticking 
out of it lying on the drawer of the cash register behind the 
counter. Upon examining the contents of the envelope, he 
discovered it contained policy slips used for taking bets. Officer 
Biro replaced the envelope and asked Hennessey to whom it belonged. 
She indicated that Ceccolini was the owner. Officer Biro relayed 
the information he had discovered to detectives, who in turn 
relayed the information to the FBI. Id., 435 U.S. at 269-70. 
Prior to Officer Biro's visit, the flower shop had been 
under surveillance pursuant to an investigation of suspected 
gambling operations, because Francis Millow, a suspect in the 
probe, regularly visited the shop. Surveillance had been 
discontinued a year prior to Officer Biro's visit and discovery. 
Four months after Biro's discovery, an FBI agent interviewed 
Hennessey. She indicated her willingness to assist the officers. 
Ceccolini was subsequently summoned before a grand jury, and denied 
that he had taken bets from Millow. Hennessey testified to the 
contrary. Ceccolini was indicted for perjury, and convicted based 
on Hennessey's testimony. Id., 435 U.S. at 271-2. 
The Supreme Court declined to adopt a per se rule that 
testimony of a live witness should never be excluded. Ceccolini, 
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435 U.S. 274. The Supreme Court began its inquiry by examining the 
degree of free will exercised by the witness: 
The greater the willingness of the witness to 
freely testify, the greater the likelihood that he or she 
will be discovered by legal means and, concomitantly, the 
smaller the incentive to conduct an illegal search to 
discover the witness.4 Witnesses are not like guns or 
40f course, the analysis might be 
different where the search was conducted by the 
police for the specific purpose of discovering 
potential witnesses. 
documents which remain hidden from view until one turns 
over a sofa or opens a filing cabinet. Witnesses can, 
and often do, come forward and offer evidence entirely of 
their own volition. And evaluated properly, the degree 
of free will necessary to dissipate the taint will very 
likely be found more often in the case of live-witness 
testimony than other kinds of evidence. The time, place 
and manner of the initial questioning of the witness may 
be such that any statements are truly the product of 
detached reflection and a desire to be cooperative on the 
part of the witness. And the illegality which led to the 
discovery of the witness very often will not play any 
meaningful part in the witness' willingness to testify. 
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276-7. 
The Supreme Court drew careful distinctions between 
cases, such as Ceccolini, where the witness is not a putative 
defendant, and those cases, such as the case now before this Court, 
where the witness is a defendant. 
[A] t least in a case such as this, where not only was the 
alleged "fruit of the poisonous tree" the testimony of a 
live witness, but unlike Wong Sun the witness was not a 
putative defendant, an examination of our cases persuades 
us that the Court of Appeals was simply wrong in 
concluding that if the road were uninterrupted, its 
length was immaterial. 
Id., 435 U.S. at 275. 
[T] he degree of free will exercised by the witness is not 
irrelevant in determining the extent to which the basic 
purpose of the exclusionary rule will be advanced by its 
application. This is certainly true when the challenged 
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statements are made by a putative defendant after arrest, 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491, 83 S.Ct. 
407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 
590, 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), and a 
fortiori is true of testimony given by nondefendants. 
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276. 
After discussing the high institutional costs associated 
with preventing a witness from testifying, the Court held that a 
closer link between the illegality and the testimony sought to be 
excluded is required than for exclusion of physical evidence. Id. , 
435 U.S. 278. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 
S.Ct. 613, , 38 L.Ed. 2d 561, 571 (1974) ("Despite its broad 
deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted 
to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all 
proceedings or against all persons. As with any remedial device, 
the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas 
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously 
served."). 
Applying attenuation analysis to the facts of the case, 
the Court concluded: 
[W] e hold that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that 
the degree of attenuation was not sufficient to dissipate 
the connection between the illegality and the testimony. 
The evidence indicates overwhelming that the testimony 
given by the witness was an act of her own free will in 
no way coerced or even induced by official authority as 
a result of Biro's discovery of the policy slips. Nor 
were the slips themselves used in questioning Hennessey. 
Substantial periods of time elapsed between the time of 
the illegal search and the initial contact with the 
witness, on the one hand, and between the latter and the 
testimony at trial on the other. While the particular 
knowledge to which Hennessey testified at trial can be 
logically traced back to Biro's discovery of the policy 
slips, both the identity of Hennessey and her 
relationship with the respondent were well known to those 
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investigating the case. There is, in addition not the 
slightest evidence to suggest that Biro entered the shop 
or picked up the envelope with the intent of finding 
tangible evidence bearing on an illicit gambling 
operation, much less any suggestion that he entered the 
shop and searched with the intent of finding a willing 
and knowledgeable witness to testify against respondent. 
Application of the exclusionary rule in this situation 
could not have the slightest deterrent effect on the . 
behavior of an officer such as Biro. The cost of 
permanently silencing Hennessey is too great for an 
evenhanded system of law enforcement to bear in order to 
secure such a speculative and very likely negligible 
deterrent effect. 
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279-80. 
In United States v. Cruz, 581 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1978), 
the en banc Fifth Circuit applied Ceccolini to the situation here, 
where a putative codefendant is discovered by means of an illegal 
search or seizure. In Cruz, a part time deputy sheriff made an 
illegal pretext stop of a vehicle 25 miles from the Mexican border 
to search for illegal aliens. The defendant was transporting three 
illegal aliens. Based on the testimony of two of these three at 
trial, Cruz was convicted of conspiracy to transport illegal aliens 
and three counts of transporting illegal aliens. 581 F.2d at 539-
42. The en banc Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 
The Fifth Circuit characterized Ceccolini as establishing 
a three part test:3 
30ther courts consider Ceccolini to have established a four 
part balancing test addressing: (1) the willingness of the witness 
to testify; (2) the role played by the illegally seized evidence in 
obtaining cooperation of the witness; (3) the temporal proximity 
between the illegality, the decision to cooperate, and testimony at 
trial; and (4) the police motivation in engaging in the illegal 
behavior. See United States v. Leonard!, 623 F.2d 746, 752 (2nd 
Cir.), cert, denied, 447 U.S. 928, 100 S. Ct. 3027, 65 L.Ed.2d 1123 
(1980) ; United States v. Hooten, 662 F.2d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 1981) , 
cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1004, 102 S.Ct. 1640, 71 L.Ed.2d 873 (1982); 
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(1) Directness: how direct was the relationship between 
the search and the ultimate testimony?; (2) Attenuation: 
is the causal relationship weakened by facts showing that 
the witness's voluntary detached reflection and other 
circumstances occurring after the search played a 
significant part in inducing the witness to testify; (3) 
Inhibitory Effect: would exclusion of the testimony tend 
to deter unconstitutional police misconduct? 
Cruz, 581 F.2d at 543. Applying this test to the facts of the 
case, the Fifth Circuit reversed: 
Here, each test points to the same result; all 
weights must be placed on the "suppress" side of the 
balance. The witnesses were initially questioned at the 
very scene of arrest and detained only as a result of the 
illegal stop. They were detained until the trial, and 
their testimony can hardly be said to be either voluntary 
or the result of detached reflection. They were 
discovered as a result of a search having no purpose 
other than their discovery and apprehension. Finally, 
the exclusion of their testimony is likely to deter such 
searches in the future. The Ceccolini analysis commands 
the exclusion of the testimony indispensable to the 
conviction. 
Id. See also United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (similar case where testimony of illegal aliens in van 
held unattenuated from illegal search). 
The en banc D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reached a 
similar result in suppressing the testimony of a state's witness in 
United States v. Scios, 590 F.2d 956 (D.C.Cir. 1978). Scios was 
arrested pursuant to a warrant for illegal wiretapping of a 
pharmacy. At the time of his arrest, an FBI agent riffled through 
Scios's business files and removed a file pertaining to the 
wiretapped pharmacy. A motel receipt in that file indicated that 
State v. Bravo, 762 P.2d 1318, 1327 (Ariz. 1988), cert, denied, 490 
U.S. 1039, 109 S.Ct. 1942, 104 L.Ed.2d 413 (1989). Appellant will 
utilize this four part approach in this brief. 
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a "Mr. Massa" had registered for the room. Massa was located and 
reluctantly testified against Scios at trial. 590 F.2d at 961. 
The en banc D.C. Circuit reversed: 
The case at bar stands in marked contrast to 
Ceccolini on these critical factors: (1) In Ceccolini, 
Hennessey's testimony "was an acto of her own free will 
in no way coerced or even induced by official authority." 
In contrast, Massa initially refused to consult with the 
authorities, and agreed to confer and to testify only in 
response to pressure by the prosecutor, including the 
threat of a contempt citation. 
(2) Massa's existence as a potential witness 
was entirely unknown to the authorities before they 
searched Scios's files. 
(3) The search of Scios's files was to gain 
evidence, the FBI having come to the scene to arrest 
Scios for illegal wiretapping. 
Excluding the fruit of that illegal search 
cannot be dismissed as of "negligible deterrent effect." 
* * * * * * 
We conclude, in sum, that the taint of the 
illegal search and seizure of the folder was not 
dissipated . . . 
Scios, 590 F.2d at 963 (footnote omitted). 
State v. Bravo, 762 P.2d 1318 (Ariz. 1988), cert, denied, 
490 U.S. 1039, 109 S.Ct. 1942, 104 L.Ed.2d 413 (1989), concerns 
discovery of a putative defendant from statements taken after 
defendant asserted his Miranda rights. The court found that the 
testimony of the witness, a co-participant in the robbery with 
which Bravo was charged, should have been excluded. 
Analyzing the facts under the Ceccolini factors, the 
court found the purpose of the Miranda violation was to obtain 
evidence. 762 P. 2d at 1327-8. The court also found the time lapse 
factor cut in favor of exclusion. The police located the witness 
immediately, and cut a deal with him. The subsequent time lapse 
prior to trial was irrelevant, as the witness was in no position to 
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back out of his deal. 762 P. 2d at 1328-9. The link between the 
illegal confession and the testimony of the witness was direct. 
Prior to Bravo's admissions, the police "didn't have a clue" that 
the witness existed or had helpful testimony. 762 P.2d at 1329. 
With respect to the voluntariness of the witness, the court noted 
that the witness had no options. He was confronted with 
accusations, and informed that charges would not be filed if he 
cooperated. Bravo, 762 P. 2d at 1329-30. The testimony of the 
witness was suppressed. 
B. THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE REQUIRE 
SUPPRESSION. 
1. Mr. Ricks was not a willing witness; 
rather he was faced with no other 
realistic option. 
Mr. Ricks was not a willing citizen witness. Compare 
Ceccolini (citizen witness testimony properly admissible); United 
States v. Wvler, 502 F.Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (victim witness 
testimony properly admissible). Rather, he was a putative 
defendant caught with the proceeds of two armed robberies. Like 
the defendant in Bravo, Mr. Ricks was presented with no reasonable 
options. 
Mr. Ricks made the best of a bad situation, and cut the 
best deal he could. He pled guilty to one first degree felony 
aggravated robbery charge with the State agreeing to drop the 
firearm enhancement, in exchange for dismissal of an identical 
charge (including firearm enhancement) , dismissal of four second 
degree felony charges stemming from a residential burglary, and the 
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State's recommendation for probation. Mr. Ricks in fact did 
receive probation. See Addendum B. Mr. Ricks was not a willing 
witness. He would not have come forward of his own accord and said 
to the world, "I committed two armed robberies. I'm such a good 
citizen I want to tell you all about it. Please send me to prison. 
P.S. Don't forget to include the firearm enhancements." In State 
v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah 1981), the court stated that for 
evidence to be admissible under Ceccolini, the witness must have a 
motivation to testify independent of the police illegality. Here, 
Mr. Ricks had no such independent motivation. This factor cuts in 
favor of suppression. 
2. Mr. Ricks' willingness to testify 
was coerced by direct exploitation 
of the knowledge the police obtained 
by the unlawful traffic stop. 
Had Mr. Ricks been approached out of the blue and asked 
if he knew anything about any armed robberies, his likely response 
would have been the usual "I don't know what you are talking 
about." Mr. Ricks' cooperation was obtained by direct exploitation 
of the fruits of the illegal traffic stop. He was caught with 
robbery proceeds. Like the witnesses in Scios, Cruz, Bravo, and 
Ramirez-Sandoval, Mr. Ricks' connection to the robberies here was 
completely unknown to the police. The information obtained in the 
illegal traffic stop revealed his identity, and was used and 
exploited during subsequent questioning to obtain Mr. Ricks' 
assistance in testifying against Mr. McGrath. Compare United 
States v. Stevens, 612 F.2d 1226, 1229 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. 
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denied, 447 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 3011, 65 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1980) 
(testimony properly admissible where authorities had prior 
knowledge of witness and evidence against him). 
The testimony of a live witness may be so attenuated from 
the taint of evidence obtained by the illegal search that 
the evidence is not the "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
[] But for such evidence to be admissible, despite its 
connection with the illegally obtained evidence, it must 
spring basically from an independent motivation by the 
witness to make the disclosure. 
State v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah 1981) . Here, Mr. Ricks 
had no independent motivation. His testimony derives directly from 
exploitation of the knowledge gained in the course of the illegal 
traffic stop. This factor favors suppression. 
3. There was no time lapse between the 
illegal stop and the use of the 
illegally obtained evidence and 
knowledge in questioning Mr. Ricks. 
Mr. Ricks was questioned shortly after his arrest. R. 
150. There was no significant time lapse between the illegal stop 
and police efforts at making Mr. Ricks a witness against Mr. 
McGrath. While Mr. McGrath's case was originally dismissed after 
the trial court granted his motion to suppress, all time delays 
occasioned thereby are strictly attributable to the State and 
should play no role in attenuation analysis. Mr. McGrath's case 
was set for trial on Monday, June 21st, 1993, only three months 
after the illegal stop. R. 261, 263. 
Mr. Ricks was continuously incarcerated from the time of 
the stop until released on probation pursuant to his agreement to 
testify against Mr. McGrath on the day after Thanksgiving, 1993. 
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There was no time period for Mr. Ricks to consider his options free 
from the taint of the illegal stop and the coercive atmosphere of 
his subsequent detention. Nothing occurred during any time period 
to dissipate the taint of the illegal traffic stop. This factor 
favors suppression. 
4. The purpose of the illegal traffic 
stop was to obtain evidence of the 
robberies in question. 
In Brown, the Supreme Court indicated that the purpose 
and flagrancy of the police illegality was the most important of 
the factors to be considered in attenuation analysis. 422 U.S. at 
603-4. The Court again stressed this factor in Ceccolini: 
The penalties visited upon the Government, and in turn 
upon the public, because its officers have violated the 
law must bear some relation to the purposes which the law 
is to serve. 
435 U.S. at 279. This most important factor argues strongly for 
suppression here. The purpose of Officer Dwyer's stop of Mr. 
McGrath's vehicle was to investigate the prior robberies. The stop 
identified the prime suspects, uncovered evidence of those 
robberies, and led to conviction of Mr. Ricks as well as the 
conviction currently before this Court. Officer Dwyer's stop of 
Mr. McGrath was purposeful and flagrant. As in Cruz, Scios, Bravo, 
and Ramirez-Sandoval, this is a case where suppression would have 
maximum deterrent effect and be most beneficial. 
Under the analysis set forth in Ceccolini, suppression 
here is warranted and required. 
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POINT II. MR. RICKS' TESTIMONY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
INEVITABLY DISCOVERED, AND IS NOT ADMISSIBLE 
ON THAT BASIS. 
The State argued inevitable discovery at Mr. McGrath's 
original motion to suppress, R. 249-254, but the trial court agreed 
that there was no evidence on that point. R. 256. The State again 
argued inevitable discovery at the second motion to suppress. R. 
156-7. 
Under Nix v. Williams, evidence is admissible if the 
prosecution proves that the evidence would inevitably have been 
discovered. The State's theory of inevitable discovery is as 
follows: (1) there was no wrongdoing in obtaining Mr. McGrath's 
license plate number; (2) a check of motor vehicle records leads to 
Mr. McGrath; (3) the police would have consulted with Dale's 
mother; (4) she would have remembered that Dale was out with David 
Ricks that night; and finally (5) when police contacted David 
Ricks, he would have confessed, implicated Mr. McGrath, and agreed 
to testify at trial. 
The State's theory is premised on pure speculation. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that, absent the illegal 
traffic stop, Mr. Ricks would have cooperated with the police. 
While the police may have discovered that Mr. Ricks was with Mr. 
McGrath the night of these robberies, that information is not 
critical. 
What is critical is evidence tying either or both to the 
robberies. The trial court correctly found that information 
concerning an older model, full size, white pickup was 
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insufficient. The only additional information the police had was 
obtained at the illegal stop. 
Absent being apprehended in possession of robbery 
proceeds, Mr. Ricks' own self interest would require that he not 
divulge anything about the crimes he had just committed. Mr. Ricks 
had no independent motivation to implicate himself in serious 
felonies. 
The State presented evidence concerning Mr. McGrath's 
license plate, and follow-ups leading to Mrs. McGrath's statement 
that Mr. McGrath was with Mr. Ricks the evening of the robberies. 
The State wholly failed, however, to present any evidence that Mr. 
Ricks would have assisted the police absent the illegal traffic 
stop. See Mr. Ricks' testimony, R. 139-154. Because it was the 
State's burden to present such evidence, see Williams, the State's 
inevitable discovery argument must fail. State v. Northrup, 756 
P.2d 1288, 1295 (UtahApp. 1988) ("Absent sufficient particularized 
evidence of 'inevitable discovery,' we cannot speculate on unknown 
possibilities."). The State had failed to prove that Mr. Ricks 
would inevitably come forward and implicated himself and Mr. 
McGrath in the aggravated robberies. 
The inevitable discovery doctrine is unavailing to make 
Mr. Ricks' testimony admissible. 
POINT III. UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT A MORE 
STRINGENT TEST FOR ATTENUATION FOR LIVE 
WITNESS TESTIMONY. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the 
state constitution may be interpreted differently than the federal 
constitution. E.g., State v. Hvqh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-3 (Utah 1985) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 
n.8 (Utah 1988); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 
(rejecting federal automobile exception to warrant requirement); 
Foote v. Board of Pardons, 808 P. 2d 734 (Utah 1991) (extending 
state due process protections to original parole hearings). The 
separate analysis in Ceccolini applied by the Supreme Court to 
attenuation analysis for live witness testimony is unwarranted and 
makes this area of law unnecessarily complex. This Court should 
reject Ceccolini, and apply the same attenuation analysis to live 
witness testimony as is used for physical evidence. 
In Ceccolini, Justice Marshall4 wrote a very well-
reasoned dissent questioning why any distinctions should be drawn 
between live testimony and physical evidence. 435 U.S. at 285-90. 
Justice Marshall notes that the differences between these types of 
evidence have already been accommodated by existing doctrine. 
While true that live witnesses can and do come forward, this fact 
is soundly rooted and protected in the independent source doctrine, 
see Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 
S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1920), and the inevitable discovery 
rule, see Williams. Where witnesses in fact do come forward, their 
testimony is admissible as being obtained from an independent 
source. Where they would have come forward, their testimony is 
4Joined by Justice Brennan. 
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admissible under the inevitable discovery rule. Attempting to 
incorporate the considerations of these two doctrines into the co-
relative doctrine of attenuation bastardizes that doctrine. As 
Justice Marshall notes, the Supreme Court is engaged in "a form of 
judicial 'double counting.'" 435 U.S. at 287. 
This Court should also clarify that the temporal 
proximity prong of the analysis is only relevant insofar as 
something occurs in that time period to dissipate the taint. With 
respect to the Ceccolini case, the time that elapsed after the 
illegal search "is of no more relevance than would be a similar 
time period between the discovery of an object during an illegal 
search and its later introduction into evidence at trial." 435 
U.S. at 289. Thus, in the confession context (see Brown) , the time 
after an illegal arrest may be relevant to the extent an accused 
has an opportunity to consult with counsel and engage in detached 
reflection, free from the coercive pressures of the situation, on 
whether to give a statement. Where, as here, the critical fact is 
what is discovered in the course of the illegal seizure, no amount 
of time will make a difference. The bad traffic stop would taint 
Mr. Ricks testimony at trial just as much if trial were held today 
as it would at any earlier trial date. As Judge Moffat noted: 
If what you were to tell me now is that because of the 
passage of time, something that was discovered that night 
in the truck which is incriminating could no[w] be 
introduced, I would say no. If the stop was bad, the 
stop was bad and everything that flowed from it was bad. 
. . . I think that something that's bad today is going 
to be bad 50 years from today, to be used for the same 
purpose that it's bad for today, you can't resurrect it 
just by letting time go. 
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R. 159-60. 
Under article I, section 14, this Court should reject 
Ceccolini and hold that the same attenuation analysis is applicable 
to both physical evidence and verbal evidence. Additionally, this 
Court should clarify that the passage of time is only relevant 
insofar as something occurs in that time to dissipate the taint. 
REASONS SUPPORTING ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED DECISION 
This case raises novel issues concerning the suppression 
of live witness testimony. Utah has little case law addressing 
Ceccolini, and that case law only addresses it tangentially. 
Finally, Mr. McGrath's state constitutional claims are novel and 
should be addressed in a published opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. McGrath's conviction 
should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this </tt day of August, 1995. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney^for Defendant/Appellant 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 931901789FS 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
The defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence came on 
regularly for hearing on the 15th day of March 1994. The Court has 
read the defendant's written motion filed 11 January 1994, listened 
to the testimony of Detective James Glover, Marjorie McGrath and 
David Ricks, and considered the arguments of counsel regarding this 
motion. The Court also recalled and noted evidence from a similar 
motion pertaining to Case No. 931900519FS, which motion was heard 
by this Court on 9 June 1993. Based upon the foregoing, the Court 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. During the early morning hours of 22 March, 1993, two 
different convenience stores were robbed about 2 hours apart by a 
lone gunman, who escaped from both the stores on foot. The clerk-
victim at the second of the two stores saw a full-size, older model 
white pickup drive by the store about sixty to ninety seconds after 
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the robber left, and gave this information to responding police 
officers a few minutes later. No suspects or evidence relating to 
the robberies were discovered directly outside either store that 
night. 
2. About one hour and thirty-five minutes after the 
second robbery, Sergeant Jack Dwyer saw a white 1985 Ford pickup 
going south on Highland Drive at about 3 900 South. Because he had 
heard about a white older model pickup being connected with the 2 
robberies, Dwyer followed the pickup, noted that two white males 
were in the cab, and that the license plate was 587FUH. 
3• Dwyer then stopped the truck and discovered or 
elicited certain incriminating evidence or statements, all of which 
were ordered suppressed on 9 June 1993. 
4. Dwyer discovered the identities of Dale McGrath and 
David Ricks after he stopped the truck. 
5. Dwyer gave the truck license plate number to 
Detective James Glover. Glover determined that this truck was 
registered to Dale McGrath. He contacted McGrath's mother, 
Marjorie, at the address given on the truck registration, and gave 
her a subpoena to testify at the hearing on 15 March 1994.. 
6. Marjorie McGrath testified at the hearing that her 
son Dale had left the residence with David Ricks on the night of 21 
March 1993 in her son's white 1985 Ford pickup. She said that 
sometime after 22 March 1993, her son had told her that he was 
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with Ricks and was driving the truck on the night of the robberies; 
The defendant told Mrs. McGrath, as he was leaving, that he was 
driving Ricks around trying to find him a place to stay that night. 
7. David Ricks testified that he had robbed two 
convenience stores in Salt Lake County during the early morning 
hours of 22 March 1993. 
8. Ricks said that he used a disguise, and a gun 
provided by McGrath, to perform the robberies, while McGrath drove 
the getaway truck. Ricks claimed that McGrath shared in the 
robberies' proceeds and that McGrath proposed the second robbery 
after they mutually determined that the first one had not netted 
enough. 
9. Ricks further testified that in late April or early 
May of 1993, McGrath called him at the Salt Lake County Jail asking 
that Ricks take responsibility for the two robberies and promising 
that McGrath would make it up to him; that McGrath could get an 
apartment with Ricks when Ricks got out of jail. 
10. Ricks also testified that he was continuously in 
custody between his arrest on 22 March 1993, and his sentencing 
date on 11 November 1993. While in custody, Ricks was interviewed 
by police officeres both on 23 March 1993 and again in 
approximately September, 1993. During the 23 March 1993 interview, 
Ricks confessed to the robberies and implicated McGrath as a 
knowing party to the robberies. The September interview was 
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the result of a visit to the jail by Detective Glover, who was 
advised by Ricks' attorney that Ricks would make a statement and 
testify against McGrath. During that interview, Ricks agreed once 
again to testify against McGrath. Ricks hoped that his co-
operation and his testimony against McGrath would influence the 
Court to sentence him to probation. He was, in fact, placed on 
probation. 
11. On 10 September 1993, Detective Glover received a 
telephone call from the defendant, Dale McGrath. During this 
telephone call, McGrath said that he had received only $10.00 from 
Ricks on the morning of the robberies and that he therefore wanted 
the remainder of the money taken from him on 22 March 1993 returned 
to him. McGrath never stated to Det. Glover that the money was the 
proceeds of a robbery. 
12 . The stop of the pickup truck by Sergeant Dwyer on 22 
March 1993 (paragraph 3 supra) was ruled by this Court to have been 
made without an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the truck 
had some connection with a crime of which Dwyer was aware. All the 
money and weapons recovered from the defendant as a result of this 
stop, as well as any statements made by the defendant to police 
officers after his arrest and until his release from jail, were 
suppressed. 
13. After this Court suppressed the evidence noted 
above, the case against the defendant was dismissed on 11 June 
1993. It was refiled on 24 September 1993. 
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14. David Ricks, the co-defendant in the original case, 
plead guilty on 22 April 1993 to Count I as charged (Aggravated 
Robbery, a first degree felony) and Count II was dismissed. He 
testified at the preliminary hearing of the refiled charges on 18 
November 1993. 
Based upon the findings listed above, the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Although Sergeant Dwyer's stop of the white pickup on 
22 March 1993 was without probable cause or reasonable and 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity, only that evidence 
which flows directly from the stop should be suppressed. The 
prayer of the defendant in his 23 April 1993 motion was granted 
fully. 
2. Police officers or agencies may continue 
investigating a crime after a court suppresses certain evidence of 
the initial investigation. Evidence arising from that subsequent 
investigative effort is not necessarily tainted merely because 
police officers are aware of the fruits of their earlier 
investigation. This is especially so when the State can show, as 
it does in this case, that the new evidence is either unconnected 
to, or extremely attenuated from the suppressed evidence. 
3. After the 11 June 1993 dismissal, the State re-opened 
the investigation into this matter. Sometime prior to 24 September 
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1993, Ricks agreed to testify about his and defendant's 
activities on the morning of 22 March 1993, and he did in fact 
testify regarding those matters at the preliminary hearing on 18 
November 1993. His voluntary testimony in November was purged of 
any taint associated with the illegal stop of defendant's truck in 
March. This purging was effected by both the passage of time and 
Ricks' voluntary confession and statements. 
4. Statements made by the defendant to police officers 
after his release from jail in March of 1993 are not fruit of the 
poisonous tree. These statements were initiated by the defendant, 
were over the telephone, and concerned ownership of some U.S. 
currency recovered from the defendant's pockets on the morning of 
22 March 1993. Defendant's statement that only $10.00 of the 
currency was the proceeds of a robbery was not the result of police 
questioning. 
5. The testimony of Marjorie McGrath regarding her son's 
activities on the evening of 21 March 1993 is not fruit of the 
poisonous tree, since her observations in this regard were made 
before, and entirely independent of, the illegal stop several hours 
later. Her conversations with her son regarding his involvement in 
the robberies is free of any police action and occurred outside and 
away from the jail. It is therefore untainted by the illegal stop. 
6. There is no evidence that this Court's 9 June 1993 
order, suppressing evidence obtained as the result of the stop of 
defendant's truck on the morning of 22 March 1993, has been or will 
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be violated during the presentation of the State's evidence in this 
case. 
Based upon these facts and conclusions, the defendant's 
11 January 1994 Motion to Suppress shall be, and hereby is denied. 
Dated this day of June, 1994 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to form: 
James Cope 
7K.fc<-> 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 this 1 day of June, 1994. 
im vl - (Wl 
C0062 
ADDENDUM B 
Excerpts from Mr. Ricks' criminal cases. 
Case 931900518 plea affidavit 
j udgement 
Case 931900240 information 
minute entry dismissal 
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STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL AND ORDER 
Criminal No. Cfa [c(O05\R FS 
COMES NOW, ifaxJrJ /Jn^i-k^/ Ackr , the defendant in t h i s 
case and hereby acknowledges and c e r t i f i e s the following: 
I have entered a plea of ( g u i l t y ) (no contest) to the 
fo l lowing crime(s): 







isLabps* £~fc /<{~ &</> /*.»*.* 
I have received a copy of the (charge) (information) 
against me, I have read it, and I understand the nature and elements 
of the offense(s) for which I am pleading (guilty) (no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as 
follows: ^yy oytdAsU <?H /99~h 7^L QL/L^J^ *< * fa.ffy 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am 
criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) 
charged are as follows: ^ ^^Ark *^ /?9~*> >*%- n/^-^U *< * 
«^~ 
I am entering ^ Ts/Jraese plea(s) voluntarily and with 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the court at no cost to me. I recognize that a 
condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as 
determined by the court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so 
appointed for me. 
-2 -
2. lX(have not)) (have) waived my right to counsel. 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this 
statement and understand the nature and elements of the charges, my 
rights in this and other proceedings and the consequences of my plea 
of guilty. 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney 
is >t(////i/ $> P L ? ^ ^ - - ^ / and I have had an opportunity to 
discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my guilty 
plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them 
cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the right to 
compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense to testify in 
court upon my behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf 
but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to testify or 
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be 
drawn against me if I do not testify. 
-3 -
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me 
I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for 
trial. At the trial the state of Utah will have the burden of 
proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If 
the trial -is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would have 
the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of 
Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I 
could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would 
be paid by the state. 
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for 
each offense to which I plead (d^ iljtyj (no contest). I know that by 
pleading /fguilt^j) (no contest) to an offense that carries a minimum 
mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting myself to serving a 
minimum mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the 
sentences may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, or 
both. I know that in addition to a fine a twenty-five percent (25%) 
surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated §63-63a-4, will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the court to make 
restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes. 
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive 
periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to more 
than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or 
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
-4 -
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present 
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
12. I know and understand that by pleading (guilty) (no 
contest) I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights set out 
in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by entering such 
plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the 
conduct alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s) 
is/are entered. 
13. My plea(s) of.-{guiltyj^ (no contest) (is) (is not) the 
result of a plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting 
attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea bargain, 
if any, are fully contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this 
affidavit. 
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my 
plea(s) of/jguilty)) (no contest) I must do so by filing a motion 
within thirty (30) days after entry of my plea. 
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the 
judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what 
they believe the court may do are also not binding on the court. 
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any 
kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises 
-5 -
except those contained herein and in the attached plea agreement, 
have been made to me. 
17. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I am 
free to change or delete anything contained in this statement. I do 
not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are 
correct. 
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
19. I am /*? years of age; I have attended school 
through the _jlj~h grade and I can read and understand the English 
language or an interpreter has been provided to me. I was not under 
the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which would 
impair my judgment when the decision .was made to enter the plea(s). 
I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication or 
intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
20. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, 
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or 
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily entering my plea. 





CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for^j,^ ^^j-U^y^c^ 
the defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement 
or that I have read it to him/her and I have discussed it with 
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent• To the best of 
my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's 
criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the 
other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the 
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
ATTORNEY FOR 0EPENDANT/BAR NUMBER 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in 
the case agains&fc^// Ati^U*^-^/ Js\cH defendant. I have reviewed 
this statement of the defendant and find that the declarations, 
including the elements of the offense of the charges(s) and the 
factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been 
offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the 
statement and in the attached plea agreement or as supplemented on 
-7 -
record before the court. There is reasonable cause to believe that 
the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the 
offenses(s) for which the plea(s) is/are ej>fc€^ ed an#?accep£aj*cr9 of 
the plea(s) would serve the public int* 
ATTORNEY/BAR"NUMBER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement 
and the certification of the defendant and counsel, the court 
witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea oiMTguilty) 
(no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered 
that the defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) 
set forth in the statement be accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this <p Q. day of / 





IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL UISIHICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
Plaintiff, . (COMMITMENT) 
vs. 















NOVEMBER 19, 1993 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; 0 plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of AGG ROBBERY , a felony 
of the 1ST degree, • a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by K BROWN and the State being represented by J COPE , is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; , ^
 <^ —. > L~>f\ 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; c ^ * ^ * 
XO of not less than five years and which may be for life; \ \ ^ 2 £ ) - ^ 2 > €5> • ^ S > O L < o ^ 
D not to exceed years; 
Xfr and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $1Q,QQQ PLUS 85% SURCHARGE 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
• 
XfiO Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of 3 YEAR$ pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
• Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 9ftnfined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
• Commitment shall issue 
Q A T P n t h i . 1 9 T H r i a y n f NOVEMB^ 1 ( ^ 3 /§/fjg%£s£ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
1 . , 2 
0--2_££ 
Deputy County Attorney Page of 
(White—Court) (Green—Judge) (Yellow—J*il/Pnson/AP&P) (PinK—Defense) (GoidenmH—e.—. 
Judgment/State v. RICKS, DAVID ANTHONY , C R 9 3 1 9 0 0&1 n 8nn r ahio RICHARD H MOFFAT 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
D Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole. 
D Serve . 
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing 
D Pay a fine in the amount of $ D at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole; or D at the rate of . 
%% Pay restitution in the amount of $ ; or Kl in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of ; or • at a rate to be determined by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
a Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or treatment as 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Enter, participate in, and complete the program at 
D Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or D vocational training a as directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with 
D Participate in and complete any training a as directed by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; or • with 
XX Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs. 
)£X Submit to drug testing. 
XX Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs. 
)tX Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. 
XX Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
XX Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
XX Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
D Take antabuse • as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment. 
D Maintain full-time employment. 
XX Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling. 
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
• Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with 
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service restitution in lieu of days in jail. 
XX Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
Erfendant is ordered to appear before this Court on for a review of this sentence, D Defend i  
U DEFENDANT TO OBTAIN 6ED 
H DEFENDANT TO UNDERGO ANY EVALUATION, TREATMENT OR COUNSELING AS RECOMMENDED 
H DEFENDANT TO TAKE MEDICATION AS RECOMMENDED 
H DEFENDANT TO APPEAR WHEN SUBPOENA AND TESTIFY TRUTHFULLY 
H DEFENDANT TO BE RELEASED FROM JAIL ON NOVEMBER 22, 1993 TO 
H DEFENDANT TO PAY ALL OUTSTANDING FINES 
DATED this 1 9 T Hday of 
Page 2 of 2 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
ROGER S. BLAYLOCK, Bar No. 0367 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Phone: (801) 468-3422 •w\ 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
A-BRIAN M. BURTON 3-16-73, 
OTN 
B-DAVID ANTHONY RICKS 6-6-73, 
aka DAVID ANTHONY PRESCOTT 
OTN 
Defendant(s). 
Screened by: R. BLAYLOCK 
Assigned to: TBA 
BAIL $5,000 EACH 
INFORMATION 
Criminal No. 
931 QCnH-IZ. FS 
The undersigned, DETECTIVE C. CHILTON - WEST VALLEY CITY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT, under oath states on information and belief that 
the defendant(s) committed the crime(s) of: 
COUNT I 
BURGLARY, a Second Degree Felony, at 3881 West Crown Avenue, #B, 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about October 
12, 1992, through October 29, 1992, in violation of Title 
76, Chapter 6, Section 202, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendants, BRIAN M. BURTON and 
DAVID ANTHONY RICKS, parties to the offense, entered or 
remained unlawfully in the dwelling of Albert F. Humphrey 
with the intent to commit a theft; 
COUNT II 
THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, at 3881 West Crown Avenue, #B, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about October 12, 
1992, through October 29, 1992, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendants, BRIAN M. BURTON and 
DAVID ANTHONY RICKS, parties to the offense, obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of 
Albert F. Humphrey with the purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof, and that the value of said property exceeded 
$1,000; 
INFORMATION 
STATE v. BRIAN M. BURTON 
DAVID ANTHONY RICKS 
County Attorney #93-3-00039 
Page 2 
COUNT III 
THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, at 3381 South Crown Avenue, #B, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about October 12, 
1992, through October 29, 1992, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, DAVID ANTHONY RICKS, a 
party to the offense, obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the firearm of Albert F. Humphrey with the 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof; 
COUNT IV 
THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, at 3881 West Crown Avenue, #B, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about October 12, 
1992, through October 29, 1992, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, BRIAN M. BURTON, a party 
to the offense, obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the firearm of Albert F. Humphrey with the 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Albert F. Humphrey Deputy Stidham • Deputy S. Winters Agent 
Spence Nielsen Detective A. Casanova Steven Prescott Diane 
Prescott Chad D. Goodrich Alan Boyd Wall Denzil Cummins 
Justin L. Dahlquist Frank E. Reedy Detective M, Wells 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Affiant, a West Valley City Police Officer, bases this 
Information upon the statements of Albert F. Humphrey in the report 
of Jerry Randall, number 92-19517, that when he returned to his 
apartment at 3881 West Crown Avenue, on October 29, 1992, after 
being gone since October 12, 1992, he found the sliding glass door 
had been opened and stereo equipment, a VCR/Television, a VCR, 
telephones, blank checks, beer, clothes, and firearms, valued at 
over $6,000, were taken without his permission. 
(Continued on Page 3) 
I T A T C ^ S B R I A N M7 BURTON 
RDAVID ANTHONY RICKS 
County Attorney #93-3-00039 
Page 3 
Affiant also bases this Information upon the admissions of 
the defendants, Brian Burton and David Ricks, that they entered the 
residence and took the property, including a .357 pistol which Ricks 
took and then sold to a person who lived in the Crown Apartments, 
and a .22 rifle which Burton took and kept. 
d.&tu-u^ 
Affiant 
L tQ before me 
ahUBTy, 1993. 
A \ 
Authorized for presentment and 
filing: 
\ \ S J W A R D X . WATSON 
«ALTw uy 




" E D DISTRICT COURT 
TWrd Judicial District 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID ANTHONY RICKS, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY - NOTICE 
Date: MAY 3, 1993 
Case No: 931900240 FS 
Judge: KENNETH RIGTRUP 
Clerk: CUG 
Reporter: CECILEE WILSON 
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(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
(Second Degree Felony) 
Appearing for the State is GREG WARNER. The defendant is 
present. Appearing as counsel for the defendant is LYNN R. BROWN. 
On state's motion court orders case dismissed as part of a plea 
bargain. 
